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Our Terms of Reference required us to make findings as to:

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  1. whether there was any information provided or otherwise available to relevant [Public] sector agencies that could or should have alerted them to the terrorist attack and, if such information was provided or otherwise available, how the agencies responded to any such information, and whether that response was appropriate; and
  2. the interaction amongst relevant [Public] sector agencies, including whether there was any failure in information sharing between the relevant agencies; and
  3. whether relevant [Public] sector agencies failed to anticipate or plan for the terrorist attack due to an inappropriate concentration of counter-terrorism resources or priorities on other terrorism threats; and
  4. whether any relevant [Public] sector agency failed to meet required standards or was otherwise at fault, whether in whole or in part; and
  5. any other matters relevant to the purpose of the inquiry, to the extent necessary to provide a complete report.

 

What Public sector agencies knew about the terrorist

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Part 6: What Public sector agencies knew about the terrorist sets out the evidence and rationale for our findings.

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“The terrorist attack” means the terrorist attack carried out by the individual in accordance with his planning and preparation over the previous years.

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We find that:

  1. The only information about the individual that was known by New Zealand Public sector agencies before 15 March 2019 that could or should have alerted them to the terrorist attack was the email sent by the individual to the Parliamentary Service.
  2. The Parliamentary Service acted appropriately within a period of time that was reasonable in the circumstances in response to the email sent just before the terrorist attack.
  3. There was no other information provided or otherwise available to any relevant Public sector agency that could or should have alerted them to the terrorist attack.
  4. There was no failure in information sharing between the relevant Public sector agencies.

 

Read Part 6: What Public sector agencies knew about the terrorist

 

Assessing the counter-terrorism effort

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Part 8: Assessing the counter-terrorism effort sets out the evidence and rationale for our findings.

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We conclude that the concentration of counter-terrorism resources on the threat of Islamist extremist terrorism before the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service’s baselining project began in 2018 was inappropriate because it:

  1. was not based on an informed assessment of the threats of terrorism associated with other ideologies; and
  2. did not result from a system-wide decision that, despite the absence of such an assessment, counter-terrorism resources should continue to be allocated almost exclusively to the threat of Islamist extremist terrorism.

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We find that:

  1. the inappropriate concentration of resources on the threat of Islamist extremist terrorism did not contribute to the individual’s planning and preparation for his terrorist attack not being detected. And for that reason, the Public sector agencies involved in the counter-terrorism effort did not fail to anticipate or plan for the terrorist attack due to an inappropriate concentration of counter-terrorism resources. 
  2. no Public sector agency involved in the counter-terrorism effort failed to meet required standards or was otherwise at fault in respects that were material to the individual’s planning and preparation for his terrorist attack not being detected.

 

Read Part 8: Assessing the counter-terrorism effort

 

The firearms licence

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Part 5: The firearms licence sets out the evidence and rationale for our findings.

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We find that:

New Zealand Police failed to meet required standards in the administration of the firearms licensing system in that:

  1. the Arms Manual, the Master Vetting Guide and the Firearms Licence Vetting Guide did not provide coherent and complete guidance as to the processing of applications where the applicant could not provide a near-relative referee able to be interviewed in person;
  2. New Zealand Police did not put in place arrangements to ensure that firearms licensing staff received systematic training and regular reviews of their practice; and
  3. in dealing with the individual’s firearms licence application, New Zealand Police did not adequately address the issue whether gaming friend and their parent knew the individual well enough to serve as referees.

 

Read Part 5: The firearms licence