6. Recommendations for implementation

6.1 Overview

1

This chapter makes a number of recommendations for implementation.

6.2 Timing of implementation

2

Some recommendations should be able to be implemented relatively quickly, such as assigning ministerial responsibility (Recommendations 1 and 43), establishing funding (Recommendation 14) and the formation of forums that enable community voices to influence decision-making (Recommendations 7 and 44). Implementation of other recommendations may take more time, to enable public conversations to take place (Recommendations 15 and 37), establishing a new agency (Recommendation 2) and reviewing legislation (Recommendations 18, 39, 40 and 41).

3

Some outcomes may only become evident over a period of years – in particular, trust and confidence in Public sector agencies involved in the counter-terrorism effort will not increase overnight.

6.3 Strong government leadership and direction are required

4

The recommendations we make cover a number of Public sector agencies and ministerial portfolios. As we have explained we see our recommendations as a package. As such they would be best implemented under the leadership of one minister who would coordinate with all ministers responsible for the implementation of the recommendations. The same minister would be responsible for communicating the government’s implementation plan and providing regular progress reports to New Zealanders. Advice provided by Public sector agencies on the government’s implementation plan should be proactively released.

6.4 We all have a role in making New Zealand safe and inclusive

5

To assist social change, rebuild trust and confidence in Public sector agencies and particularly those involved in the counter-terrorism effort and enhance social licence of the counter-terrorism effort, communities, civil society, local government and the private sector should be involved in the design of the government’s implementation plan. The members of our Muslim Community Reference Group could assist although wider community involvement will also be required.

6

We cannot see how trust can be rebuilt within ethnic and religious communities without their active participation in the design and implementation of the solutions we have proposed. We have engaged with affected whānau, survivors and witnesses and Muslim communities and their views have informed our recommendations. Engagement of the kind we have participated in and which we envisage for the future goes beyond current Public sector practice of inform or consult. It requires involvement, collaboration and empowerment of New Zealanders as we described in chapter 5. It will also mean a substantial commitment of time and resources and perhaps a mindset change. But it will have the advantage that the outcome will have the support of those whose trust is critical to securing a safer and more inclusive New Zealand.

7

We recommend the establishment of an oversight group that includes representatives of communities, civil society, local government, the private sector, affected whānau, survivors and witnesses and our Muslim Community Reference Group. The make-up of the oversight group would include a gender balance, ethnic and religious diversity, a range of ages (youth, adults and elders) and geographical spread.

8

It will be responsible for providing advice to the responsible minister (Recommendation 43) on the design of the government’s implementation plan and its roll-out. Their advice, and that of Public sector agencies, is to be made publicly available to enhance transparency.