1

We conclude that the concentration of counter-terrorism resources on the threat of Islamist extremist terrorism before the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service’s baselining project began in 2018 was:

  1. not based on an informed assessment of the threats of terrorism associated with other ideologies; and
  2. did not result from a system-wide decision that, despite the absence of such an assessment, counter-terrorism resources should continue to be allocated almost exclusively to the threat of Islamist extremist terrorism.

It was therefore inappropriate.

2

We find that the inappropriate concentration of resources on the threat of Islamist extremist terrorism did not contribute to the individual’s planning and preparation for his terrorist attack not being detected. And for that reason, the Public sector agencies involved in the counter-terrorism effort did not fail to anticipate or plan for the terrorist attack due to an inappropriate concentration of counter-terrorism resources.

3

We find no Public sector agency involved in the counter-terrorism effort failed to meet required standards or was otherwise at fault in respects that were material to the individual’s planning and preparation for his terrorist attack not being detected.